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A Reckless Disregard for the Truth?  The 
Constitutional Right to Lie in Politics 
JASON ZENOR* 
ABSTRACT 
In the first presidential campaign following the controversial United States 
Supreme Court decision in Citizens United, much attention was given to 
the record amount of money spent on the election—close to $3 billion.  
Ideally, more money spent on campaigning would permit more speech and 
add to the public discourse, and allowing more speech would encourage 
and permit bad speech to be countered with good speech.  In 2012, 
however, claims arose that the candidates were being more negative than 
ever, including resorting to outright deception. 
 
Many states have laws on the books that prohibit knowingly false campaign 
speech on material facts when there is a showing of actual malice, but the 
impact of these laws is unclear.  In 2012, in the midst of the discussion 
surrounding the negative or untrue campaign speech, the United States 
Supreme Court quietly denied certiorari to a case that held one such law 
unconstitutional.  That same month, the Court decided Alvarez v. United 
States, which held that the government could not punish a person for 
knowingly telling a lie without a showing of actual harm.  Ultimately, it 
seems that the Supreme Court’s actions are the death knell for the 
remaining false campaign speech statutes.  Accordingly, this Article will 
argue that the Supreme Court needs to reconsider the protection for false 
speech.  The Article forwards a new legal test that parallels the political 
speech doctrine with the commercial speech doctrine by giving less 
protection to knowingly false campaign speech. 
 
 
 
 
 
* Jason Zenor, Assistant Professor, School of Communication, Media and the Arts, SUNY 
Oswego.  The author would like to express his gratitude to Paul Siegal and the staff of 
Campbell Law Review for their comments on earlier drafts.  All remaining errors are my 
own. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The 2012 election season—the first presidential campaign 
post-Citizens United1—set new standards in American politics.  The 2012 
elections broke records for the amount of money spent on advertising.2  
There was also a never-ending amount of political punditry on cable news, 
as well as chatter on the Internet echo chambers.3  But more disconcerting 
 
 1. Citizens United v. FEC, 588 U.S. 310, 340 (2010). 
 2. David Lieberman, Political Groups Spent Record $3.37B on TV for 2012 
Campaign: Analyst, DEADLINE HOLLYWOOD (Nov. 30, 2012, 10:19 AM), 
http://www.deadline.com/2012/11/political-advertising-tv-2012-campaign [http://perma.cc/
VFR5-DQ39].  Groups spent a record $3.37 billion on the 2012 presidential campaign, a 
first since Citizens United.  Id.  This was up 35% from 2008.  Id. 
 3. See, e.g., Campaign 2012: Too Negative, Too Long, Dull, PEW RES. CTR. (Jan. 18, 
2012), http://www.people-press.org/2012/01/18/campaign-2012-too-negative-too-long-dull 
[http://perma.cc/U4T2-YJGZ]. 
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were the claims that the candidates were being more negative than ever, 
including resorting to outright deception.4 
During the 2012 presidential campaign, the candidates and their 
surrogates made many claims with what can arguably be described as a 
reckless disregard for the truth.  For example, the Obama campaign ran an 
advertisement that made strong innuendoes that Mitt Romney was 
responsible for the death of a woman who had cancer because her husband 
lost his job and health insurance at a steel mill owned by the Romney-run 
Bain Capital.5  In reality, Romney left Bain Capital a few years prior to the 
woman’s diagnosis, and she had actually lost her medical insurance from 
her own job.6  Likewise, Democratic Senate Majority Leader Harry Reid 
made unsubstantiated accusations that Mitt Romney had not paid taxes in 
ten years.7 
President Obama was also the victim of lies and distortion.  For 
instance, Paul Ryan suggested at the Republican National Convention that 
a General Motors factory in Wisconsin remained closed because Obama 
had failed to keep a campaign promise to bring recovery to areas such as 
Janesville, Wisconsin, where a General Motors factory was closed.8  The 
truth was that the plant closed before President Obama took office.9  A 
Romney Super PAC published claims that “Barack Hussein Obama 
will . . . force doctors to assist homosexuals in buying surrogate babies 
[and] . . . force courts to accept Islamic Sharia law in domestic disputes.”10  
 
 4. See, e.g., Study: Obama, Romney Wage Most Negative Race in Recent History, 
ADVERT. AGE (Oct. 3, 2012), http://adage.com/article/campaign-trail/study-obama-romney-
wage-negative-race-recent-history/237565 [http://perma.cc/2MS6-DEAW]. 
 5. Halimah Abdullah, Campaign 2012: Smoke and Mirrors or Outright Lies, CNN 
(Aug. 8, 2012, 1:37 PM), http://www.cnn.com/2012/08/08/politics/campaign-distortions 
[http://perma.cc/TNJ5-4RZG].  The advertisement was published by Priorities USA, an 
Obama Super PAC.  Id.  In the ad, the husband says: “When Mitt Romney closed the plant I 
lost my health care, and my family lost their health care . . . .”  Id. 
 6. Id. 
 7. Id. 
 8. See Lucy Madison, Paula Reid & Stephanie Condon, Fact-Checking 6 Claims in 
Paul Ryan’s Convention Speech, CBS NEWS (Aug. 30, 2012, 6:13 PM), 
http://www.cbsnews.com/8301-250_162-57503683/fact-checking-6-claims-in-paul-ryans-
convention-speech [http://perma.cc/QMY4-USHH]. 
 9. Id. 
 10. Barack Hussein Obama Will Move America to . . ., GOV’T IS NOT GOD, 
http://www.gingpac.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/08/GINGadFinal.pdf 
[http://perma.cc/DD9M-KZDL] (last visited Mar. 21, 2016).  This ad was placed in nineteen 
newspapers in three states.  Becky Bowers, Ad Claims Obama Will ‘Force Doctors to Assist 
Homosexuals in Buying Surrogate Babies’, Politifact, TAMPA BAY TIMES (Sept. 27, 2012, 
5:16 PM), http://www.politifact.com/truth-o-meter/statements/2012/sep/27/government-not-
3
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In all, during the 2012 presidential election, Mitt Romney’s claims were 
judged to be false 25% of the time,11 and Barack Obama’s comments were 
judged to be false 15% of the time.12 
Despite these alarming numbers, the truth is that campaign lies are not 
new.13  During the 1800 presidential campaign, John Adams supporters 
claimed that if Thomas Jefferson won the presidency, “[Americans] would 
see our wives and daughters the victims of legal prostitution” and alleged 
that “murder, robbery, rape, adultery and incest [would] openly be taught 
and practiced.”14  In 1884, opponents accused Grover Cleveland of 
fathering a child out of wedlock, and created the national slogan, “Ma, Ma, 
Where’s My Pa?”.15 
More recently, in 1988, George H. W. Bush’s campaign aired the 
infamous “Willie Horton” advertisement which implied that Dukakis was 
responsible for the furlough of a convicted murderer who committed rape 
while on release.16  The truth was that the furlough program had been 
signed into law during an earlier Republican administration.17  During the 
 
god-pac/ad-claims-obama-will-force-doctors-assist-homosexu [http://perma.cc/36G3-
2P3G]. 
 11. Mitt Romney’s File, Politifact, TAMPA BAY TIMES, 
http://www.politifact.com/personalities/mitt-romney [https://web.archive.org/web/20130615
000000*/http://www.politifact.com/personalities/mitt-romney] (last visited Mar. 13, 2013).  
The site broke down his statements as follows: True 15%; Mostly True 16%; Half True 
28%; Mostly False 16%; False 16%; and Pants on Fire [egregious lie] 9%.  Id. 
 12. Barack Obama’s File, Politifact, TAMPA BAY TIMES, 
http://www.politifact.com/personalities/barack-obama [https://web.archive.org/web/201303
20170745/http://www.politifact.com/personalities/barack-obama] (last visited Mar. 20, 
2013).  This includes statements judged since 2008.  The breakdown is as follows: True 
22%; Mostly True 24%; Half True 27%; Mostly False 12%; False 14%; Pants on Fire 
[egregious lie] 1%.  Id. 
 13. Rick Ungar, The Dirtiest Presidential Campaign Ever? Not Even Close!, FORBES 
(Aug. 20, 2012, 7:50 PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/rickungar/2012/08/20/the-dirtiest-
presidential-campaign-ever-not-even-close [https://perma.cc/WJ3D-26N7]; see also BRUCE 
L. FELKNOR, DIRTY POLITICS (1966) (recounting author’s experiences regarding the ethics of 
political campaigns as executive director of the Fair Campaign Practices Committee). 
 14. Ungar, supra note 13. 
 15. Peter Wehner, Some Historical Perspective on Negative Campaigning, 
COMMENTARY (Oct. 29, 2010, 3:38 PM), http://www.commentarymagazine.com/
2010/10/29/some-historical-perspective-on-negative-campaigning [https://perma.cc/299W-
YAPN]. 
 16. Roger Simon, The GOP and Willie Horton: Together Again, POLITICO (May 19, 
2015, 5:12 AM), http://www.politico.com/story/2015/05/jeb-bush-willie-horton-118061 
[http://perma.cc/8DR2-EEA8]. 
 17. Roger Simon, How a Murderer and Rapist Became the Bush Campaign’s Most 
Valuable Player, BALT. SUN (Nov. 11, 1990), http://articles.baltimoresun.com/1990-11-
11/features/1990315149_1_willie-horton-fournier-michael-dukakis [http://perma.cc/3G3T-
4
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2000 South Carolina Republican Primary, opposition to John McCain 
alleged that he was secretly gay, that his adopted daughter was actually his 
half-black, biological child who was born out of wedlock, and that his wife, 
Cindy McCain, was a drug addict.18  Likewise, in 2004, a group of former 
Vietnam POWs challenged the legitimacy of John Kerry’s military 
commendations despite never having actually served with Kerry.19 
In response to the perception of lies in politics, many states passed 
false campaign speech laws to punish anyone who tells lies of material fact 
in support of a candidate when it is done with actual malice.20  Recently, 
however, these laws have been challenged and some courts have deemed 
them unconstitutional.21  In June 2012, the United States Supreme Court 
denied certiorari to a case out of the Eighth Circuit that had overturned a 
Minnesota false campaign speech statute.22  Additionally, in June 2014, the 
Court once again ignored the question of the constitutionality of false 
campaign speech statutes, instead leaving it for the lower courts to 
determine.23 
In 2012, the Court also decided United States v. Alvarez,24 in which 
the Court struck down the Stolen Valor Act.25  This statute was enacted and 
enforced to punish people who lied about having been awarded the 
 
UZ98].  Bush advisor Lee Atwater said, “By the time we’re finished, they’re going to 
wonder whether Willie Horton is Dukakis’ running mate.”  Id.; see also KERWIN SWINT, 
MUDSLINGERS: THE TWENTY-FIVE DIRTIEST POLITICAL CAMPAIGNS OF ALL TIME 153–58 
(2008). 
 18. Jennifer Steinhauer, Confronting Ghosts of 2000 in South Carolina, N.Y. TIMES 
(Oct. 19, 2007), http://www.nytimes.com/2007/10/19/us/politics/19mccain.html?_r=0 
[http://perma.cc/4EXM-P2EM]. 
 19. See Kate Zernike, Kerry Pressing Swift Boat Case Long After Loss, N.Y. TIMES 
(May 28, 2006), http://www.nytimes.com/2006/05/28/washington/28kerry.html?ex=130646
8800&en=7158a80120f0ee5a&ei=5089 [http://perma.cc/J7E7-N8VY].  The POW group 
was called Swift Boat Veterans for Truth; the term “swiftboating” is now used to refer to 
when a left-leaning politician has been a victim of lies against him/her in a political 
campaign.  Swift-Boating Law & Legal Definition, USLEGAL, http://definitions.uslegal.com/
s/swift-boating [http://perma.cc/VLQ3-MEP7] (last visited Mar. 21, 2016). 
 20. See infra Part I-B. 
 21. See, e.g., 281 Care Comm. v. Arneson, 638 F.3d 621, 636 (8th Cir. 2011); Rickert 
v. Washington, 168 P.3d 826, 827 (Wash. 2007). 
 22. Arneson, 638 F.3d at 636 (holding that MINN. STAT. § 211B.06 (2014) is 
unconstitutional). 
 23. Susan B. Anthony List v. Driehaus, 134 S. Ct. 2334, 2338 (2014) (holding that 
there was an imminent threat of future prosecution sufficient to establish ripeness under 
Article III). 
 24. United States v. Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. 2537 (2012).   
 25. Id. at 2543 (holding the Stolen Valor Act, 18 U.S.C. § 704(b) (2012) 
unconstitutional). 
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Congressional Medal of Honor.26  In striking down this law, the Court 
applied strict scrutiny to false speech of material fact27 despite its prior 
holding that such speech had no particular value.28 
When one examines the precedent surrounding false speech and 
including Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission,29 which gives 
almost absolute protection to political speech,30 it seems clear that false 
campaign speech statutes are quickly becoming an endangered species.  
However, this Article will argue that these laws maintain an important and 
necessary function and that the United States Supreme Court needs to 
reconsider its precedent on false speech of material fact by placing more 
restrictions on such speech, particularly in contemporary politics where 
there is so little regulation.31 
In Part I, this Article describes the adverse effects that negative 
campaigns have had on the political system, including causing widespread 
distrust and apathy.  Part I-A examines these harms while Part I-B presents 
the laws enacted to prevent them.  Part II outlines the legal precedent in 
areas of false speech, including political opinion, libel, and false 
advertising.  Part II-A outlines the hierarchy of speech protection by first 
discussing the most protected form of speech: political speech.  Part II-B 
examines the legal precedent surrounding forms of false speech, both 
protected and unprotected.  Finally, in Part III this Article argues the 
United States Supreme Court needs to re-categorize false speech by 
subjecting it to only intermediate scrutiny review.  This Article discusses 
the application of a test parallel to the commercial speech doctrine, treating 
false campaign speech like false advertising, and argues that enforceable 
false campaign speech laws would protect the integrity of the electoral 
process. 
I. THE REGULATION OF FALSE CAMPAIGN SPEECH: THE HARM TO THE 
POLITICAL PROCESS AND THE REACTION OF THE STATES 
Concern about the amount of lies in American politics is not new.  In 
fact, states began passing false campaign speech laws during the 
Progressive era.32  Today, such statutes are in question as courts are 
 
 26. Id. at 2542. 
 27. Id. at 2543–44. 
 28. Hustler v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 52 (1988). 
 29. Citizens United v. FEC, 588 U.S. 310 (2010).  
 30. Id. at 340 (“[I]t might be maintained that political speech simply cannot be banned 
or restricted as a categorical matter . . . .”). 
 31. See infra Part I-B. 
 32. See infra note 49 and accompanying text. 
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considering them to be unconstitutional.  But, false campaign speech may 
be having a greater impact on the electorate’s voting decisions due to the 
sheer amount of money and exposure funneled into contemporary politics. 
A. The Harms of Negative Political Campaigns 
Critics argue that campaign distortion has destroyed the way the 
public perceives the political system.33  False campaign speech has lowered 
the quality of political discourse as campaign strategists now have to focus 
on creating and responding to the overwhelming number of negative attack 
ads.34  All of this leads to a frustrated electorate that has chosen to check 
out of the process, leaving the political game to those with the greatest 
monetary investment in the system.35  Consequently, extreme partisan 
politicians use political lies to serve very narrow private interests.  It 
appears that the majority of politicians is only concerned with winning 
campaigns and is rarely concerned with educating the electorate or finding 
the truth. 
The distortion of political issues and policies has serious impact on the 
outcome of elections and the ultimate decision makers that are sworn into 
public office.  One poll found that even before Citizens United there was 
“strong evidence that voters were substantially misinformed on many of the 
issues prominent in the election campaign, including the stimulus 
legislation, the healthcare reform law, TARP, the state of the economy, 
climate change, campaign contributions by the US Chamber of 
Commerce[,] and President Obama’s birthplace.”36  Moreover, the influx of 
 
 33. E.g., JOSEPH CUMMINS, ANYTHING FOR A VOTE: DIRTY TRICKS, CHEAP SHOTS, AND 
OCTOBER SURPRISES IN U.S. PRESIDENTIAL CAMPAIGNS (2007); RYAN HOLIDAY, TRUST ME, 
I’M LYING: CONFESSIONS OF A MEDIA MANIPULATOR (2012); KATHLEEN HALL JAMIESON, 
DIRTY POLITICS: DECEPTION, DISTRACTION, AND DEMOCRACY (1992); RICHARD K. SCHER, 
THE MODERN POLITICAL CAMPAIGN: MUDSLINGING, BOMBAST, AND THE VITALITY OF 
AMERICAN POLITICS (1997); KERWIN SWINT, supra note 17. 
 34. See SHANTO IYENGAR & JENNIFER MCGRADY, MEDIA POLITICS 150, 168 (2007) 
(“The most compelling explanation of negative campaigning is that one attack invites a 
counterattack, thus setting in motion a spiral of negativity.”). 
 35. The voter turnout was only 57.5% for the 2012 presidential election; voter turnout 
was 62.3% in 2008, 60.4% in 2004, and 54.2% in 2000.  Kevin Liptak, Report Shows 
Turnout Lower Than 2008 and 2004, CNN (Nov. 8, 2012, 4:39 PM), 
http://politicalticker.blogs.cnn.com/2012/11/08/report-shows-turnout-lower-than-2008-and-
2004 [http://perma.cc/4C2Z-TQ54].  Yet, a record $3.37 billion was spent in the 2012 
election, much of that by special interest groups free to do so because of Citizens United.  
Lieberman, supra note 2. 
 36. CLAY RAMSAY ET AL., WORLDPUBLICOPINION.ORG, MISINFORMATION AND THE 2010 
ELECTION: A STUDY OF THE US ELECTORATE 4 (2010), http://www.worldpublicopinion.org
/pipa/pdf/dec10/Misinformation_Dec10_rpt.pdf [http://perma.cc/7YTK-2JBT]; see also 
7
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money involved in political campaigns after Citizens United has made it 
even more disheartening for the common citizen.37  The explosion in 
advertising money spent by corporations and Super PACs has undermined 
the “free marketplace of ideas” argument that more speech is better.38  The 
cacophony of special interest voices has made it difficult to discern the 
truth.39  This rampant distortion and misinformation can lead to corrupted 
channels of communication and lower voter turnout, and thus an 
underrepresented electorate.40  The direct harm to the political system is 
that if voters are misled, the results of the election do not truly reflect the 
will of the people.41  False campaign speech disrupts the citizenry’s ability 
to willfully choose its own direction.42 
 
Alexander Burns, How Much Do Voters Know?, POLITICO (Mar. 13, 2012, 2:12 PM), 
http://www.politico.com/story/2012/03/are-voters-dumb-073947 [http://perma.cc/BQJ2-
39HF]. 
 37. Lee Goldman, False Campaign Advertising and the “Actual Malice” Standard, 82 
TUL. L. REV. 889, 895–97 (2008) (discussing the problems caused by false campaign 
advertising).  “Voter distrust [in political campaigns] has become so great that some in the 
advertising industry view it as a threat to their business.”  Id. at 895 n.47. 
 38. See N.Y. Bd. of Elections v. Torres, 552 U.S. 196, 208 (2008) (“The First 
Amendment creates an open marketplace where ideas, most especially political ideas, may 
compete without government interference.”).  One study found that Citizens United allowed 
corporations and Super PACs to account for 78% of the $465 million of outside money 
spent during the 2012 campaign season.  Adam Gabbatt, Citizens United Accounts for 78% 
of 2012 Election Spending, Study Shows, GUARDIAN (Sept. 24, 2012, 2:20 PM), 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2012/sep/24/super-pac-spending-2012-election 
[http://perma.cc/CV65-PF43]. 
 39. See RAMSAY ET AL., supra note 36. 
 40. Louis A. Day, Political Advertising and the First Amendment, in POLITICAL 
COMMUNICATION 39, 41 (Robert Mann & David D. Perlmutter eds., 2011).  “[T]he use of 
the known lie as a tool is at once at odds with the premises of democratic government and 
with the orderly manner in which economic, social, or political change is to be effected.”  
Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 75 (1964). 
 41. Jonathan D. Varat, Deception and the First Amendment: A Central, Complex, and 
Somewhat Curious Relationship, 53 UCLA L. REV. 1107, 1108 (2006) (“[Deception] may 
distort politics and undermine the proper functioning of our representative democracy.  It 
may threaten corruption of our government and the effective functioning of our economy.  
No wonder our laws contain so many restrictions on false, deceptive, and misleading 
communications.”). 
 42. E.g., Charles Fried, The New First Amendment Jurisprudence: A Threat to Liberty, 
59 U. CHI. L. REV. 225, 233 (1992) (“[L]ying, while not the most damaging offense to 
another’s moral right, is one of the clearest.”); see also William P. Marshall, False 
Campaign Speech and the First Amendment, 153 U. PA. L. REV. 285, 294 (2004) (“[I]f a 
campaign statement convinces voters that by voting for candidate A, they will elect 
someone who supports policy Z, when the truth is that candidate A opposes policy Z, the 
result of the election is distorted.”). 
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When it comes to the harms of false campaign speech, courts have 
consistently argued that the answer is more speech in the free marketplace 
of ideas.43  The argument is that political deception will be caught by media 
watchdogs or political opponents with the self-incentive of survival.44  But, 
the noise caused by false statements can cause the public to lose faith in the 
electoral process.45  One poll found that this ubiquitous distortion in politics 
has led 70% of respondents to believe little or nothing of what they hear in 
political ads.46  As one Republican media consultant analogized: 
“If . . . every carrier in the airline industry ran commercials about how 
many people were killed in competitors’ plane crashes—and the 
competition responded in kind—nobody would feel safe driving or flying 
anywhere.  That’s not much different from what’s happening in politics 
today.”47  In today’s hyper-mediated environment, which feeds people 
information that reinforces already-held beliefs, the effectiveness of any 
watchdogs or self-defense is waning.48 
B. The Law on False Campaign Speech 
In response to the proliferation of deception in politics, some states 
passed laws barring false campaign speech.49  Nineteen states have passed 
statutes prohibiting false campaign speech in some form.50  These statutes 
 
 43. See Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 354 (2010); Abrams v. United States, 
250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting). 
 44. See Rickert v. Wash. Pub. Disclosure Comm’n, 168 P.3d 826, 829 (Wash. 2007). 
 45. See Marshall, supra note 42, at 295. 
 46. Susan Page, Nasty Ads Close Out a Mud-Caked Campaign, USA TODAY (Nov. 2, 
2006, 11:55 PM), http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/news/washington/2006-11-02-negative-
ads_x.htm [http://perma.cc/K4NN-LAA4]. 
 47. Goldman, supra note 37, at 896 (quoting ED ROLLINS WITH TOM DEFRANK, BARE 
KNUCKLES & BACK ROOMS: MY LIFE IN AMERICAN POLITICS 350 (1996)). 
 48. Ashley Muddiman et al., Media Fragmentation, Attribute Agenda Setting, and 
Political Opinions About Iraq, 58 J. BROADCASTING & ELECTRONIC MEDIA 215, 215 (2014) 
(describing empirical research finding that those who only watched one cable news network 
had opinions reflecting that network’s political view). 
 49. See Developments in the Law–Elections, 88 HARV. L. REV. 1111, 1273–79 (1975) 
(citing cases upholding state laws against false campaign speech where the court held that 
these laws are directed at the protection of the political process and not the individual’s 
reputation). 
 50. ALASKA STAT. § 15.13.095 (2012); COLO. REV. STAT. § 1-13-109 (2015); FLA. 
STAT. § 104.271 (2015); 10 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/29-4 (2014); LA. STAT. ANN. § 18:1463 
(2008); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 56, § 42 (2014); MINN. STAT. § 211B.06 (2014); MISS. CODE 
ANN. § 23-15-875 (2015); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 163-274(a)(7)–(8) (2015); N.D. CENT. CODE 
§ 16.1-10-04 (2015); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3517.21–.22 (LexisNexis 2013); OR. REV. 
STAT. § 260.532 (2013); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 12-13-16 (2004); TENN. CODE ANN. 
§ 2-19-142 (2014); UTAH CODE ANN. § 20A-11-1103 (LexisNexis 2010); VA. CODE ANN. 
9
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vary in the type of speech they restrict; some prohibit any false speech 
regarding another candidate,51 while others restrict comments regarding a 
candidate’s moral integrity.52  Some statutes follow the actual malice 
standard from the tort of libel and place restrictions on knowingly false 
speech.53  Likewise, some restrict false speech in certain fora such as 
political advertisements,54 while others restrict false speech during 
telephone polling,55 or at a polling place.56 
The constitutionality of these laws has been challenged in courts 
throughout the last two decades.  First, in 1998, a Washington state law 
was deemed unconstitutional.57  The statute punished the sponsor of any 
political advertisement that contained false speech regarding material fact if 
the false speech was published with “actual malice.”58  The Washington 
Supreme Court stated that the law erroneously “presupposes [that] the State 
possesses an independent right to determine truth and falsity in political 
 
§ 24.2-1005.1(A) (2011); WASH. REV. CODE § 42.17A.335 (2014); W. VA. CODE § 3-8-11 
(2013); WIS. STAT. § 12.05 (2011). 
 51. E.g., COLO. REV. STAT. § 1-13-109 (2015); LA. STAT. ANN. § 18:1463 (2008); 
MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 56, § 42 (2014); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3517.21 (LexisNexis 2013); 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 20A-11-1103 (LexisNexis 2010); W. VA. CODE § 3-8-11(c) (2013); 
WIS. STAT. § 12.05 (2004). 
 52. E.g., MISS. CODE ANN. § 23-15-875 (2015). 
 53. E.g., ALASKA STAT. § 15.13.095(a) (2012); COLO. REV. STAT. § 1-13-109(2)(a) 
(2015); LA. STAT. ANN. § 18:1463 (2008); MINN. STAT. § 211B.06 (2014); N.C. GEN. STAT. 
§ 163-274(a)(7)–(8) (2015); N.D. CENT. CODE § 16.1-10-04 (2015); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. 
§ 3517.21 (LexisNexis 2013); OR. REV. STAT. § 260.532 (2013).  Some statutes that allowed 
liability on a standard less than actual malice have been struck down or amended to include 
an actual malice standard.  See, e.g., Weaver v. Bonner, 309 F.3d 1312, 1319 (11th Cir. 
2002) (addressing the constitutionality of Canons of the Georgia Code of Judicial Conduct 
and JQC rule regulating statements by judicial candidates); Ancheta v. Watada, 135 F. 
Supp. 2d 1114, 1122–23 (D. Haw. 2001) (examining provisions of the statutory Code of 
Fair Campaign Practices); Butler v. Alabama Judicial Inquiry Comm’n, 802 So. 2d 207, 
218–19 (Ala. 2001) (examining the Federal Constitution of Alabama Canon of Judicial 
Ethics); In re Chmura, 608 N.W.2d 31, 43–44 (Mich. 2000) (addressing the constitutionality 
of Canon 7(B)(1)(d) of the Code of Judicial Conduct); State v. Jude, 554 N.W.2d 750, 753–
54 (Minn. Ct. App. 1996).  See also MASS. GEN. LAWS. ch. 56, § 42 (2014); MISS. CODE 
ANN. § 23-15-875 (2015); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 12-13-16 (2004); TENN. CODE ANN. 
§ 2-19-142 (2014); UTAH CODE ANN. § 20A-11-1103 (LexisNexis 2010); W. VA. CODE 
§ 3-8-11(c) (2013); WIS. STAT. § 12.05 (2011). 
 54. E.g., MINN. STAT. § 211B.06 (2014); N.D. CENT. CODE § 16.1-10-04 (2015); OR. 
REV. STAT. § 260.532(1) (2013); TENN. CODE ANN. § 2-19-142 (2014). 
 55. ALASKA STAT. § 15.13.095 (2012). 
 56. E.g., MINN. STAT. § 211B.11 (2014). 
 57. State ex rel. Pub. Disclosure Comm’n v. 119 Vote No! Comm., 957 P.2d 691, 695–
99 (Wash. 1998). 
 58. Id. at 693. 
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debate.”59  The court held that the law was unconstitutional because it was 
a content-based regulation that did not survive strict scrutiny, because the 
government had no compelling state interest in prohibiting such speech.60 
The state of Washington subsequently amended the statute so that it 
only prohibited political advertisements that contained false speech about a 
particular candidate for public office.61  The amended law was again 
challenged, and in 2007 the Washington Supreme Court held the statute 
was unconstitutional because it did not survive strict scrutiny.62  The court 
held that a state’s compelling interest in protecting the integrity of elections 
was not asserted in this case.63  Nonetheless, even if the state interest had 
been asserted, this law did not serve the state’s interest because it targeted 
all false speech, not just defamatory speech.64  The court also held that the 
law was overbroad because it did not punish lies about oneself or other 
statements that hurt the integrity of the election.65  The dissent argued that 
the court’s decision was an “invitation to lie with impunity.”66 
Minnesota had a similar false campaign speech statute that was 
challenged.  The Minnesota law prohibited political advertisements or 
campaign materials that disseminated false speech promulgated with actual 
malice.67  The state of Minnesota added the actual malice standard in 1996 
after a previous version of the law was deemed overbroad because it only 
required that the defendant “kn[ew] or ha[d] reason to believe [the 
statement]  [wa]s false.”68  The addition of the actual malice standard was 
not sufficient, however, as the Eighth Circuit held that false campaign 
speech was not outside of First Amendment protection.69  The Minnesota 
 
 59. Id. at 695. 
 60. Id. at 699.  The court stated that the false campaign speech law was “patronizing 
and paternalistic.”  Id. at 698 (footnote omitted). 
 61. See Rickert v. Washington, 168 P.3d 826, 827 (Wash. 2007). 
 62. Id. at 831. 
 63. Id.  “More importantly, in light of the heightened protections for political speech 
afforded by the First Amendment, there simply cannot be any legitimate, let alone 
compelling, interest in permitting government censors to vet and penalize political speech 
about issues or individual candidates.”  Id. at 829–30. 
 64. Id. at 831. 
 65. Id. 
 66. Id. at 833 (Madsen, J., dissenting).  “It is little wonder that so many view political 
campaigns with distrust and cynicism.”  Id. 
 67. MINN. STAT. § 211B.06(a) (2014) (“A person is guilty of a gross misdemeanor who 
intentionally participates in the preparation, dissemination, or broadcast of paid political 
advertising or campaign material . . . that is false, and that the person knows is false or 
communicates to others with reckless disregard of whether it is false.”). 
 68. State v. Jude, 554 N.W.2d 750, 753–54 (Minn. Ct. App. 1996). 
 69. 281 Care Comm. v. Arneson, 638 F.3d 621, 636 (8th Cir. 2011). 
11
Zenor: A Reckless Disregard for the Truth? The Constitutional Right to L
Published by Scholarly Repository @ Campbell University School of Law,
52 CAMPBELL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 38:41 
Court of Appeals held that false campaign speech does not implicate the 
same interest as libel, which is justified by the falsity and the injury to a 
private person.70  The court added that political speech deserved the most 
protection, and thus held that the law failed to pass constitutional muster 
because it did not survive strict scrutiny.71 
After the United States Supreme Court denied certiorari in 2012, the 
state of Minnesota challenged the Eighth Circuit’s holding and asked the 
court to apply intermediate scrutiny.72  The Eighth Circuit again applied 
strict scrutiny and deemed the Minnesota statute unconstitutional, holding 
that it “is not necessary, is simultaneously overbroad and underinclusive, 
and is not the least restrictive means of achieving any stated goal.”73 
Finally, Ohio’s law prohibiting false campaign speech was recently 
challenged.74  The Ohio law made it a crime to “[p]ost, publish, circulate, 
distribute, or otherwise disseminate a false statement concerning a 
candidate, either knowing the same to be false or with reckless disregard of 
whether it was false or not, if the statement is designed to promote the 
election, nomination, or defeat of the candidate.”75  The law also penalized 
making “a false statement concerning the voting record of a candidate or 
public official.”76  A pro-life advocacy group named Susan B. Anthony List 
planned to erect a billboard advertisement against Representative Steven 
Driehaus, a Democrat from Ohio, who was running for reelection.77  The 
billboard read, “Shame on Steve Driehaus! Driehaus voted FOR 
taxpayer-funded abortion.”78  The statement was in reference to Driehaus’s 
vote in favor of the Affordable Care Act.79  Upon hearing reports of the 
group’s plan to erect the billboard, Driehaus filed a complaint with the 
Ohio Election Commission claiming that the advertisement was factually 
 
 70. Id. at 634.  “The importance of private interests to the foundations of 
defamation-law principles prevents us from assuming its applicability to knowingly false 
political speech.  A government entity cannot bring a libel or defamation action.”  Id. 
(emphasis added). 
 71. Id. at 636 (holding that a state may regulate false speech “when it satisfies the First 
Amendment test required for content-based speech restrictions: that any regulation be 
narrowly tailored to meet a compelling government interest.”). 
 72. 281 Care Comm. v. Arneson, 766 F.3d 774, 782 (8th Cir. 2014). 
 73. Id. at 785. 
 74. Susan B. Anthony List v. Ohio Elections Comm’n, 45 F. Supp. 3d 765 (S.D. Ohio 
2014). 
 75. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3517.21(B)(10) (LexisNexis 2013). 
 76. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3517.21(B)(9) (LexisNexis 2013). 
 77. Susan B. Anthony List, 45 F. Supp. 3d at 772. 
 78. Id. 
 79. Id. 
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false and violated Ohio’s false campaign speech statute.80  The Ohio 
Election Commission ruled there was probable cause to believe that Susan 
B. Anthony List had violated the statute.81 
In response, Susan B. Anthony List challenged the constitutionality of 
the law in court.82  The lower court rejected the challenge stating that the 
issue was not ripe and the Sixth Circuit affirmed.83  Susan B. Anthony List 
appealed the decision to the United States Supreme Court, which remanded 
the case, holding that the group had “alleged a sufficiently imminent injury 
for purposes of Article III.”84  Much like the other cases, the Southern 
District of Ohio held in September 2014 that the Ohio law prohibiting false 
campaign speech was unconstitutional because it did not survive strict 
scrutiny.85 
II. THE ROOTS OF PROTECTION: FIRST AMENDMENT JURISPRUDENCE AND 
THE TREATMENT OF POLITICAL SPEECH AND FALSE SPEECH 
The freedom of speech is a fundamental right.86  Ordinarily, the 
government cannot infringe upon a fundamental right unless there is a 
compelling state interest and the restriction is narrowly tailored to serve 
that interest.87  There are, however, some categories of speech that are not 
protected,88 including obscenity,89 fighting words,90  and incitement.91  
These are categories of speech “of such slight social value as a step to truth 
 
 80. Id. 
 81. Id. 
 82. Id. 
 83. Susan B. Anthony List v. Driehaus, 525 F. App’x 415, 416 (6th Cir. 2013). 
 84. Susan B. Anthony List v. Driehaus, 134 S. Ct. 2334, 2338 (2014). 
 85. Susan B. Anthony List, 45 F. Supp. 3d at 769 (citing 281 Care Comm. v. Arneson, 
766 F.3d 774, 785 (8th Cir. 2014)). 
 86. Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 95 (1940) (“The freedom of speech and of the 
press, which are secured by the First Amendment against abridgment by the United States, 
are among the fundamental personal rights and liberties which are secured to all persons by 
the Fourteenth Amendment against abridgment by a State.”). 
 87. See Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 661–62 (1994) (holding that the 
must-carry provision of the Cable Television Consumer Protection and Competition Act of 
1992 would only have to survive intermediate scrutiny). 
 88. “[N]ot all speech is of equal First Amendment importance.”  Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. 
v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749, 758 (1985). 
 89. Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 23 (1973); see also New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 
747, 764 (1982) (holding that child pornography is unprotected by the First Amendment). 
 90. See Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572 (1942) (creating the fighting 
words doctrine). 
 91. See Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969); see also Near v. Minnesota ex 
rel. Olson, 283 U.S. 697, 716 (1931). 
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that any benefit that may be derived from them is clearly outweighed by the 
social interest in order and morality.”92  In order to understand the 
positioning of false campaign speech on the spectrum of First Amendment 
protections, it is necessary to first examine the protections given to both 
political speech and false speech, each in their own right. 
A. Political Speech 
The First Amendment has its fullest application to campaign speech.93  
As the U.S. Supreme Court has stated, “[o]ne of the prerogatives of 
American citizenship is the right to criticize public men and measures.”94  
Consequently, public officials will often be victims of “vehement, caustic, 
and sometimes unpleasantly sharp attacks.”95  Much of political speech is 
opinion, and under American jurisprudence, “there is no such thing as a 
false idea.”96 
In Brown v. Hartlage,97 a candidate for a county commissioner’s 
office in Kentucky sued the winning candidate for his campaign promise to 
lower the commissioners’ salaries if he was elected.98  The suit claimed that 
his opponent violated Kentucky’s Corrupt Practices Act.99  Though the 
U.S. Supreme Court agreed that states do “have a legitimate interest in 
preserving the integrity of their electoral processes,”100 it held that rules 
against political ideas had to survive strict scrutiny.101  The Court stated: 
Whatever differences may exist about interpretations of the First 
Amendment, there is practically universal agreement that a major purpose 
 
 92. Chaplinsky, 315 U.S. at 572. 
 93. See Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 339 (2010).  “Whatever differences may 
exist about interpretations of the First Amendment, there is practically universal agreement 
that a major purpose of that Amendment was to protect the free discussion of governmental 
affairs.”  Mills v. Alabama, 384 U.S. 214, 218 (1966). 
 94. Baumgartner v. United States, 322 U.S. 665, 673–74 (1944). 
 95. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964). 
 96. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 339 (1974). 
 97. Brown v. Hartlage, 456 U.S. 45 (1982) 
 98. Id. at 48.  “‘We abhor the commissioners’ outrageous salaries.  And to prove the 
strength of our convictions, one of our first official acts as county commissioners will be to 
lower our salary to a more realistic level.  We will lower our salaries, saving the taxpayers 
$36,000 during our first term of office, by $3,000 each year.’”  Id.  But when Brown learned 
that this promise possibly violated Kentucky’s Corrupt Practices Act, he retracted the 
statement.  Id. at 48–49. 
 99. “Candidates prohibited from making expenditure, loan, promise, agreement or 
contract as to action when elected, in consideration for vote.”  KY. REV. STAT. ANN. 
§ 121.055 (LexisNexis 2004). 
 100. Hartlage, 456 U.S. at 52. 
 101. Id. at 54. 
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of that Amendment was to protect the free discussion of governmental 
affairs.  This of course includes discussions of candidates, structures and 
forms of government, the manner in which government is operated or 
should be operated, and all such matters relating to political processes.102 
The Court held that some promises made to voters are not outside the 
protection of the First Amendment.103  Though some promises can be 
prohibited,104 most promises are “indispensable to in a democracy,”105 and 
promote accountability in electoral politics.106  The Court stated that the 
government cannot prohibit political speech on the grounds that “voters 
might make an ill-advised choice.”107 
In an attempt to prevent such ill-advised choices, Congress passed 
sweeping legislation in 2002 to try to remedy the distortions caused by the 
staggering amounts of money spent in campaigns.108  The Bipartisan 
Campaign Reform Act (BCRA) placed many restrictions on campaigns, 
including limits on soft money and when it could be used for advertising.109  
Specifically, it banned the use of soft money for issue advertising that 
refers to specific candidates.110  The Act was challenged almost 
immediately and the U.S. Supreme Court upheld the law as constitutional 
in McConnell v. FEC.111  However, in FEC v. Wisconsin Right to Life,112 
 
 102. Id. at 52–53 (quoting Mills v. Alabama, 384 U.S. 214, 218–19 (1966)). 
 103. Id. at 55.  If upheld the candidate’s victory would have been nullified because of his 
violation of the Corrupt Practices Act.  Id. at 61. 
 104. This would be “private” promises made to individuals that rise to the level of quid 
pro quo.  Prohibition of this type of corruption has been continually upheld.  See, e.g., 
Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 348 (2010) (recognizing the government’s 
compelling interest in defending against corruption in elections). 
 105. Hartlage, 456 U.S. at 55 (quoting First Nat’l. Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 
765, 777 (1978)). 
 106. “[M]aintenance of the opportunity for free political discussion to the end that 
government may be responsive to the will of the people and that changes may be obtained 
by lawful means . . . is a fundamental principle of our constitutional system.”  Stromberg v. 
California, 283 U.S. 359, 369 (1931). 
 107. Hartlage, 456 U.S. at 60.  The court once again said that the marketplace of ideas is 
the best remedy: “we depend for . . . correction not on the conscience of judges and juries 
but on the competition of other ideas.”  Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 339–40 
(1974). 
 108. See McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 115–32 (2003) (outlining the history of 
campaign finance reform). 
 109. Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-155, 116 Stat. 81. The 
act was also known as the McCain-Feingold Act.  See Shays v. FEC, 528 F.3d 914 (D.C. 
Cir. 2008). 
 110. McConnell, 540 U.S. at 134. 
 111. See id. 
 112. FEC v. Wisconsin Right to Life, Inc., 551 U.S. 449 (2007).   
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the Court overturned the provisions which placed prohibitions on 
mentioning candidates in issue advertising,113 holding that the BCRA could 
still prohibit soft money used for direct calls to vote for specific 
candidates.114 
During the 2008 presidential primary season, Citizens United, a 
conservative nonprofit organization wanted to broadcast a critical 
documentary it made about Democratic primary candidate, Hillary 
Clinton.115  The BCRA, however, prohibited such “electioneering 
communications” within thirty days of a primary.116  Citizens United 
challenged the application of the law to its documentary, arguing that the 
film was not an electioneering communication because it did not call for a 
vote against the candidate.117 
In a 5-4 decision, the U.S. Supreme Court went beyond Citizens 
United’s argument and held that the sections of the BCRA which restricted 
corporate campaign spending were unconstitutional.118  The Court ruled 
that restrictions on political spending by corporations violated the First 
Amendment and the corporations’ right to engage in political speech.119  
 
 113. Id. at 477.  “At the outset, we reject the contention that issue advocacy may be 
regulated because express election advocacy may be, and ‘the speech involved in so-called 
issue advocacy is [not] any more core political speech than are words of express 
advocacy.’”  Id. 
 114. Id. at 482. 
 115. The name of the movie was Hillary: The Movie.  See Citizens United v. FEC, 558 
U.S. 310, 319 (2010). 
 116. Id. at 321. 
 117. Id. at 322–23. 
 118. It also overturned McConnell and Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce.  
James Bopp & Richard Coleson, Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission: 
“Precisely What WRTL Sought to Avoid,” CATO SUP. CT. REV. 29, 29 (2009–2010).  The 
dissent argued that corporations do not have a right to political speech.  See Citizens United, 
558 U.S. at 393–94. 
 119. Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 339–40.  The Court has since decided a few more cases 
dealing with campaign speech.  In Arizona Free Enter. Club’s Freedom Club PAC v. 
Bennett, 131 S. Ct. 2806 (2011), the Court held, in a 5-4 decision, that an Arizona law 
which required the state to give matching funds to underfunded candidates was 
unconstitutional.  The Court said that the state’s interest in a “level playing field” did not 
justify the law.  Id. at 2812.  Justice Roberts, writing for the court, said, “in a democracy, 
campaigning for office is not a game.  It is a critically important form of speech . . . the 
guiding principle is freedom—the ‘unfettered interchange of ideas’—not whatever the State 
may view as fair.”  Id. at 2826.  The dissent, written by Justice Kagan, with whom Justice 
Ginsburg, Justice Breyer, and Justice Sotomayor joined, argued that the core purpose of the 
First Amendment is to “foster a healthy, vibrant political system full of robust discussion 
and debate.”  Id. at 2830.  The dissent also argued that the law promoted these values by 
“enhancing the ‘opportunity for free political discussion to the end that government may be 
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Justice Kennedy’s majority opinion stated that the government’s interest in 
limiting corruption in politics did not justify limiting political speech by 
corporations and other organizations.120  The Court added that “[t]he rule 
that political speech cannot be limited based on a speaker’s wealth is a 
necessary consequence of the premise that the First Amendment generally 
prohibits the suppression of political speech based on the speaker’s 
identity.”121 
B.  Unprotected False Speech 
False speech, though not one of the enumerated categories of 
unprotected speech, has raised questions about the scope of the First 
Amendment’s protections.  The U.S. Supreme Court has never held that 
false speech is per se unprotected,122 but it has stated that “[f]alse 
statements of fact are particularly valueless.”123  As a result, several 
categories of false speech have been denied constitutional protection.124  
False speech is not held to the same level as true threats or obscenity in the 
eyes of the law.125  A tension exists, however, when some types of false 
speech are particularly suspect. 
One example of false speech that is not protected is demonstrated 
through state fraud laws, which deny protection to fraudulent statements so 
long as the proof required allows for “breathing room” for protected 
speech.126  In Illinois ex rel. Madigan v. Telemarketing Associates, Inc., the 
Court upheld a state fraud law.127  In Madigan, telemarketers had made 
fundraising calls claiming that a significant amount of each dollar donated 
would be used for charitable purposes.128  The claims made were 
 
responsive to the will of the people.’”  Id. (quoting New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 
U.S. 254, 269 (1964)). 
 120. See Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 341. 
 121. Id. at 350. 
 122. United States v. Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. 2537, 2545 (2012) (plurality opinion). 
 123. Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 52 (1988). 
 124. See Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. at 2544.  Categories of speech that are not protected include: 
“advocacy intended, and likely, to incite imminent lawless 
action . . . obscenity . . . defamation . . . speech integral to criminal conduct . . . so-called 
‘fighting words,’ . . . child pornography . . . fraud . . . true threats . . . and speech presenting 
some grave and imminent threat the government has the power to prevent.”  Id. (internal 
citations omitted). 
 125. See id. at 2545–47. 
 126. See Illinois ex rel. Madigan v. Telemarketing Assocs., Inc., 538 U.S. 600, 620 
(2003). 
 127. Id. at 606. 
 128. The fundraiser was for Vietnam veterans.  Id. at 607. 
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knowingly false.129  The lower court dismissed the case on First 
Amendment grounds, but the U.S. Supreme Court held that the First 
Amendment did not bar prosecution for fraudulent claims.130  The Court 
stated that “when nondisclosure is accompanied by intentionally 
misleading statements designed to deceive the listener, the First 
Amendment leaves room for a fraud claim.”131  But the court warned that 
the government had to show exacting proof of fraud to allow for “breathing 
room” for protected speech: 
False statement[s] alone do[] not subject a fundraiser to fraud liability.  As 
restated in Illinois case law, to prove a defendant liable for fraud, the 
complainant must show that the defendant made a false representation of a 
material fact knowing that the representation was false; further, the 
complainant must demonstrate that the defendant made the representation 
with the intent to mislead the listener, and succeeded in doing so.132 
Other examples of unprotected false speech are exemplified by the 
torts of defamation and false light, in which speech can be punished so long 
as the plaintiff can show that the speaker spoke with knowledge as to the 
statement’s falsity.133  Libel, or defamatory speech that injures a person’s 
reputation, has long been recognized as a category of unprotected 
speech.134  When a public plaintiff sues for libel based on a statement of 
public concern, they are considered a public person plaintiff and bear the 
burden of proving actual malice.135  In fact, a public person plaintiff must 
prove the statement was made with actual malice.136  In New York Times v. 
Sullivan, the U.S. Supreme Court defined actual malice as a defamatory 
statement that is made “with knowledge that it was false or with reckless 
 
 129. The fundraisers knew that only 15 cents of every dollar would be used for 
charitable organizations.  Id. at 609. 
 130. Id. at 624. 
 131. Id. at 606, 612 (quoting Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 340 (1974) 
(stating that the “intentional lie” is “no essential part of any exposition of ideas”)). 
 132. Madigan, 538 U.S. at 620. 
 133. The interests protected in privacy cases punishes the falsity of the matter, whereas 
libel punishes for the injury caused to the plaintiff’s reputation.  See Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 
U.S. 374, 385 n.9 (1967). 
 134. See New York Times, Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 268 (1964).  A plaintiff suing 
for defamation has to prove four elements: false and defamatory statement, publication, 
fault, and harm.  See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 558 (AM. LAW INST. 1977).  
Because this paper is focused on political speech, it is only concerned with public person 
plaintiffs, who must prove the statement was made with actual malice.  Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 
279–80. 
 135. Id. 
 136. Id. 
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disregard of whether it was false or not.”137  The Court later said there was 
“reckless disregard for the truth” when the defendant had serious doubt as 
to the veracity of the statement.138 
In Sullivan, the Court expanded free speech protection by creating an 
exception within a category of unprotected speech, in order to avoid 
chilling protected speech.139  The Court recognized that there will 
sometimes be incorrect statements made during free debate, thus some false 
speech needs to be protected in order to give “breathing space” to the 
freedoms of expression.140  However, some speech, such as knowingly false 
speech, will be prohibited as long as there is this “breathing space” in the 
law.141 
Opinion is a common law defense to libel.  The Court expanded this 
defense in Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., when it stated “there is no such 
thing as a false idea.”142  But in Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co., the Court 
held that opinion is not a separate constitutional defense.143  The Court 
reasoned that pursuant to Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc. v. Hepps, the 
plaintiff must prove the falsity of speech on matters of public concern.144  
Since opinions cannot be proven true or false, they can never be charged as 
libel.145 
 
 137. Id. at 280. 
 138. St. Amant v. Thompson, 390 U.S. 727, 731 (1968). 
 139. See Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 300 (Goldberg, J., concurring).  “[O]ne main function of 
the First Amendment is to ensure ample opportunity for the people to determine and resolve 
public issues.  Where public matters are involved, the doubts should be resolved in favor of 
freedom of expression rather than against it.”  Id. at 302 (Goldberg, J., concurring) (quoting 
WILLIAM O. DOUGLAS, THE RIGHT OF THE PEOPLE 41 (1958)). 
 140. Id. at 271–72. 
 141. In libel law, this breathing space is the “actual malice” standard.  Id. at 279–80. 
 142. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 339 (1974).  “However pernicious an 
opinion may seem, we depend for its correction not on the conscience of judges and juries 
but on the competition of other ideas.”  Id. at 339–40. 
 143. Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co., 497 U.S. 1, 3 (1990).  Most states do provide a 
separate protection for opinion under the common law.  GENELLE BELMAS & WAYNE 
OVERBECK, MAJOR PRINCIPLES OF MEDIA LAW 138 (2012). 
 144. See Milkovich, 497 U.S. at 19 (citing Philadelphia Newspapers v. Hepps, 475 U.S. 
767 (1986)). 
 145. Chief Justice Rehnquist gave an example of the difference: “[U]nlike the statement, 
‘In my opinion Mayor Jones is a liar,’ the statement, ‘In my opinion Mayor Jones shows his 
abysmal ignorance by accepting the teachings of Marx and Lenin,’ would not be 
actionable.”  Milkovich, 497 U.S. at 20.  Of course, in this example, Chief Justice Rehnquist 
did not say what would happen if Mayor Jones did not accept the teaching of Marx and 
Lenin and this comment was made during the Red Scare when such a claim would have 
been libel per se.  An oft-quoted test for opinion came from the federal courts.  In Ollman v. 
Evans, 750 F.2d 970, 979 (D.C. Cir. 1984), the court held that one must look at: (1) the 
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There are other instances where false speech has been denied 
protection despite not being enumerated as per se unconstitutional.  For 
instance, there is a federal statute which makes it a crime to lie about being 
a federal officer.146  Likewise, the American court system has a long history 
of enforcing perjury laws.147  Despite the lack of social value of false 
speech, there are many instances in which false speech is tolerated. 
C.  Protected False Speech: Alvarez 
In United States v. Alvarez, a defendant was charged under the Stolen 
Valor Act for falsely claiming he was a recipient of the Congressional 
Medal of Honor.148  The Stolen Valor Act made it a federal crime to lie 
about having received the medal.149  In a 6-3 decision, the U.S. Supreme 
Court overturned Alvarez’s conviction and held that the Act was 
unconstitutional.150 
The plurality of the Court held that false speech is not outside of the 
First Amendment.151  Though the Supreme Court has often said that false 
speech has no value, it has only said so in the context of cases involving a 
 
specific language of the disputed statement; (2) the verifiability of the statement; (3) the 
literary context in which the statement was made; and (4) the broader social context of the 
statement.   
 146. See United States v. Lepowitch, 318 U.S. 702 (1943) (upholding the 
constitutionality of 18 U.S.C. § 76). 
 147. See United States v. Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. 2537, 2546 (2012).  “These examples, to 
the extent that they implicate fraud or speech integral to criminal conduct, are inapplicable 
[to false speech laws].”  Id. 
 148. Id. at 2542. 
 149. 18 U.S.C. § 704 (2012).  The statute reads in part: 
(b) FALSE CLAIMS ABOUT RECEIPT OF MILITARY DECORATIONS OR MEDALS.—
Whoever falsely represents himself or herself, verbally or in writing, to have been 
awarded any decoration or medal authorized by Congress for the Armed Forces of 
the United States . . . shall be fined under this title, imprisoned not more than six 
months, or both. 
(c) Enhanced Penalty For Offenses Involving Congressional Medal Of Honor.— 
(1) IN GENERAL.—If a decoration or medal involved in an offense under 
subsection (a) or (b) is a Congressional Medal of Honor, in lieu of the 
punishment provided in that subsection, the offender shall be fined under this 
title, imprisoned not more than 1 year, or both. 
Id. 
 150. See Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. at 2543.  “Although the statute covers respondent’s speech, 
the Government argues that it leaves breathing room for protected speech, for example 
speech which might criticize the idea of the Medal or the importance of the military.  The 
Government’s arguments cannot suffice to save the statute.”  Id. 
 151. Id. at 2544–45. 
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“legally cognizable harm associated with [the] false [speech].”152  In other 
contexts, speech prohibitions aimed at false speech would be considered 
content-based regulations, and thus would be required to survive strict 
scrutiny.153  In Alvarez, the Court agreed that the government had a 
compelling state interest in protecting the integrity of the Congressional 
Medal of Honor,154 but it held that the restriction was not narrowly tailored 
to serve that interest.155 
Additionally, the Court found no proof that the public perception of 
the medal was affected.156  The Court said that “[s]ociety has the right and 
civic duty to engage in open, dynamic, rational discourse.  These ends are 
not well served when the government seeks to orchestrate public discussion 
through content-based mandates.”157  Finally, the Court returned to the 
marketplace of ideas metaphor and stated that “[t]he remedy for speech that 
is false is speech that is true.”158  The plurality suggested that false speech 
is protected so long as it is not defamatory and no direct harm comes from 
the lies.159 
 
 152. Id. at 2545.  “Instead, content-based restrictions on speech have been permitted, as a 
general matter, only when confined to the few ‘historic and traditional categories [of 
expression] long familiar to the bar.’”  Id. at 2544.  These categories include 
“incitement . . . ; obscenity . . . ; defamation . . . ; speech integral to criminal conduct . . . ; 
fighting words . . . ; child pornography . . . ; fraud . . . ; and true treats. . . [.]”  Id. (internal 
citations omitted). 
 153. Id. at 2543–44. 
 154. Id. at 2548–49.  The Court stated: 
[T]he lie might harm the Government by demeaning the high purpose of the 
award, diminishing the honor it confirms, and creating the appearance that the 
Medal is awarded more often than is true.  Furthermore, the lie may offend the 
true holders of the Medal.  From one perspective it insults their bravery and high 
principles when falsehood puts them in the unworthy company of a pretender. 
Id. at 2549. 
 155. Id. at 2549. 
 156. See id. at 2550. 
 157. Id.  The Court stated that an internet database that listed all Medal of Honor 
recipients would be a less restrictive alternative.  Id. at 2551. 
 158. Id. at 2550. 
 159. The Court added: 
Were [we] to hold that the interest in truthful discourse alone is sufficient to 
sustain a ban on speech, absent any evidence that the speech was used to gain a 
material advantage, it would give government a broad censorial power 
unprecedented in this Court’s cases or in our constitutional tradition.  The mere 
potential for the exercise of that power casts a chill, a chill the First Amendment 
cannot permit if free speech, thought, and discourse are to remain a foundation of 
our freedom. 
Id. at 2547–48. 
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In a concurring opinion, Justice Breyer, joined by Justice Kagan, 
wrote that intermediate scrutiny should be applied to false speech.160  
Justice Breyer stated that this level of scrutiny is needed when a speech 
prohibition warrants neither automatic disapproval, nor automatic 
approval.161  Justice Breyer argued that false speech concerning 
“philosophy, religion, history, the social sciences, [or] the arts”162 should 
receive the highest order of protection, but, in this case the speech was not 
about any of these categories.  Instead Alvarez’s speech constituted “false 
statements about easily verifiable facts.”163  Justice Breyer admitted that the 
Court had a history of overturning laws that have a chilling effect, but 
argued that the mens rea requirement of false speech allows for breathing 
space.164  Under this theory, the concurrence still would have overturned 
the law under intermediate scrutiny because there was no proof of harm 
and the law allowed the government to choose who it would prosecute.165 
In the Alvarez dissent, Justice Alito argued that “false statements of 
fact merit no First Amendment protection in their own right.”166  Justice 
Alito argued that in the context of speech where there may be some value, 
the Court has allowed for “breathing space” with legal tests like actual 
 
 160. Id. at 2552; see Bd. of Tr. v. Fox, 492 U.S. 469, 480 (1989) (requiring a “reasonable 
fit” between rule and the interest being served); see also In re R.M.J., 455 U.S. 191, 203 
(1982) (“[I]nterference with speech must be in proportion to the [substantial governmental] 
interest served.”); Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 568 (1968). 
 161. Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. at 2552 (Breyer, J., concurring).  Justice Breyer argued: 
False factual statements can serve useful human objectives, for example: in social 
contexts, where they may prevent embarrassment, protect privacy, shield a person 
from prejudice, provide the sick with comfort, or preserve a child’s innocence; in 
public contexts, where they may stop a panic or otherwise preserve calm in the 
face of danger; and even in technical, philosophical, and scientific contexts, where 
(as Socrates’ methods suggest) examination of a false statement (even if made 
deliberately to mislead) can promote a form of thought that ultimately helps 
realize the truth. 
Id. at 2553. 
 162. Id. at 2552. 
 163. Id. 
 164. Id. at 2553.  Note, Justice Breyer did mention two false campaign speech cases—
United We Stand America, Inc. v. United We Stand, America New York, Inc., 128 F.3d 86 
(2d Cir. 1997) and Treasurer of the Comm. To Elect Gerald D. Lostracco v. Fox, 389 
N.W.2d 446 (Mich. App. 1986)—and stated that: “Without expressing any view on the 
validity of those cases, I would also note, like the plurality, that in this area more accurate 
information will normally counteract the lie.”  Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. at 2556. 
 165. Id.  “Further, the pervasiveness of false statements, made for better or for worse 
motives, made thoughtlessly or deliberately, made with or without accompanying harm, 
provides a weapon to a government broadly empowered to prosecute falsity without more.”  
Id. at 2553. 
 166. Id. at 2562 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
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malice;167 here, he argued, there was no fear that a law might chill protected 
speech when it only prohibits a person from knowingly and purposely 
telling a lie.168 
III. THE RESOLUTION OF THE GROWING ISSUE: TREATING FALSE 
CAMPAIGN SPEECH LIKE FALSE ADVERTISING 
The free market place of ideas is an oft-cited metaphor to represent 
our national free-speech jurisprudence.169  The metaphor prescribes that the 
remedy to “bad” speech is more “good” speech.170  But when it comes to 
false speech, “[it] interfere[s] with the truth-seeking function of the 
marketplace of ideas, and [it] cause[s] damage . . . that cannot easily be 
repaired by counterspeech, however persuasive or effective.”171  And 
unfortunately, the “truth rarely catches up with a lie.”172  The current 
precedent on false speech and political speech has turned the First 
Amendment “into a shield for the ‘unscrupulous . . . and skillful’ liar to use 
knowingly false statements as an ‘effective political tool’ in election 
campaigns.”173  Thus, false speech, including speech within the political 
arena, should not receive the highest level of speech protection.174 
 
 167. Id. at 2563–64. 
 168. Id. at 2564. 
 169. See, e.g., Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., 
dissenting). 
 170. “[T]he best test of truth is the power of the thought to get itself accepted in the 
competition of the market . . . .”  Id. 
 171. Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 52 (1988) (citing Gertz v. Robert 
Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 340, 344 n.9 (1974)). 
 172. Gertz, 418 U.S. at 344 n.9. 
 173. Rickert v. Washington, 168 P.3d 826, 833 (Wash. 2007) (Madsen, J., dissenting) 
(citing Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 75 (1964)).  The Garrison case is quoted as 
follows: 
The use of calculated falsehood, however, would put a different cast on the 
constitutional question.  Although honest utterance, even if inaccurate, may 
further the fruitful exercise of the right of free speech, it does not follow that the 
lie, knowingly and deliberately published about a public official, should enjoy a 
like immunity.  At the time the First Amendment was adopted, as today, there 
were those unscrupulous enough and skillful enough to use the deliberate or 
reckless falsehood as an effective political tool to unseat the public servant or 
even topple an administration. 
Id. 
 174. See infra Part III-A. 
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A. Defining the Level of Scrutiny 
The United States Supreme Court has refused to create new categories 
of speech as its precedents “cannot be taken as establishing a free-wheeling 
authority to declare new categories of speech outside the scope of the First 
Amendment.”175  Accordingly, in Alvarez, the Court held that false speech 
would not be deemed an unprotected category of speech.176  Despite this, 
false speech should not enjoy the same protection as other political speech.  
In Garrison v. Louisiana,177 the Court held that criticisms of public officials 
were relevant and worthy of protection,178 but the Court’s reasoning should 
not be read to encompass intentional lies about a person,179 even in the 
political realm. 
In Sullivan, the Court allowed for some false speech to be protected in 
order to preserve “uninhibited, robust, and wide-open” debate.180  In 
creating the actual malice standard, however, the Court did not protect 
knowingly false political speech: “[f]or the use of the known lie as a tool is 
at once at odds with the premises of democratic government and with the 
orderly manner in which economic, social, or political change is to be 
effected.”181  Intentional lies deviate from the fundamental principle of 
“uninhibited, robust, and wide-open debate” in the public realm182 as it 
creates political apathy and distrust.183 
 
 175. United States v. Stevens, 130 S. Ct. 1577, 1586 (2010) (refusing to categorize 
animal crush films as a category of unprotected speech).  The Court has acknowledged that 
perhaps there exist “some categories of speech that have been historically unprotected, but 
have not yet been specifically identified or discussed . . . in our case law.”  Id. 
 176. Id. at 2547.  “[T]he Court must be presented with ‘persuasive evidence that a novel 
restriction on content is part of a long (if heretofore unrecognized) tradition of 
proscription . . . .”  Id. (quoting Brown v. Entm’t Merchs. Ass’n, 131 S. Ct. 2729, 2734 
(2011) (applying strict scrutiny to a California law that banned the sale of violent video 
games to minors). 
 177. Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64 (1964) (overturning the Louisiana criminal libel 
statute because it punished true statements and had no actual malice fault standard). 
 178. Id. at 76–77.  “Debate on public issues will not be uninhibited if the speaker must 
run the risk that it will be proved in court that he spoke out of hatred; even if he did speak 
out of hatred, utterances honestly believed contribute to the free interchange of ideas and the 
ascertainment of truth.”  Id. at 73. 
 179. “[O]nly those false statements made with the high degree of awareness of their 
probable falsity demanded by New York Times may be the subject of either civil or criminal 
sanctions.”  Id. at 74. 
 180. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964). 
 181. Garrison, 379 U.S. at 75. 
 182. Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 270. 
 183. See supra Part II. 
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Moreover, just because “speech is used as a tool for political ends 
does not automatically bring it under the protective mantle of the 
Constitution.”184  Citizens United suggested that “it might be maintained 
that political speech simply cannot be banned or restricted as a categorical 
matter.”185  This should not be the case, however, as plenty of categories of 
speech including obscenity, incitement, and fighting words can be punished 
even within the realm of politics.186  Furthermore, Citizens United is a stop 
on prior restraint of speech,187 but the principle of Citizens United does not 
bar a post-publication punishment.188  For example, explicit quid pro quo 
can be punished where a politician gives kickbacks to a corporation for the 
money it contributed to his campaign.189 
If courts extended the libel analogy for false campaign speech, they 
would find that when politicians knowingly lie during a campaign, it is not 
the functional equivalent of neutral reportage or making a mistake in 
reporting hot news.190  Rather, false speech of this sort is more similarly 
akin to a reckless disregard for the truth; it is politicians using bad sources, 
not checking information, or ignoring the obvious truth.191  As Justice 
Alito’s dissent argued in Alvarez, “[t]he statute reaches only knowingly 
false statements about hard facts directly within a speaker’s personal 
knowledge.  These lies have no value in and of themselves, and proscribing 
them does not chill any valuable speech.”192 
By reducing the standard to which false campaign speech is held from 
strict scrutiny to intermediate, politicians and candidates are held 
 
 184. Garrison, 379 U.S. at 75. 
 185. Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 340 (2010) (citations omitted). 
 186. See supra notes 88–91 and accompanying text. 
 187. Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 337 (overturning law that restricted political speech 
thirty days prior to a political primary and thirty days prior to a general election). 
 188. Id.; see Jacob Eisler, The Unspoken Institutional Battle over Anticorruption: 
Citizens United, Honest Services, and the Legislative-Judicial Divide, 9 FIRST AMEND. L. 
REV. 363, 410 (2010–2011).  (“[T]he Court laid out its basic position—campaign regulation 
that infringes upon substantial First Amendment rights is impermissible unless the 
governmental interest is preventing explicit quid pro quo.”). 
 189. See, e.g., Skilling v. United States, 130 S. Ct. 2896, 2907 (2010) (upholding federal 
criminal prosecution of bribery and kickback schemes involving public officials); see also 
Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., 556 U.S. 868, 872 (2009) (holding that a judge who 
received a large campaign contribution from litigant should have recused himself). 
 190. See Curtis Publ’g Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130, 132 (1967) (consolidated with 
Associated Press v. Walker) (holding that “hot news” is less scrutinized when determining 
whether a journalist had “reckless disregard for the truth”). 
 191. Id.  “In short, the evidence is ample to support a finding of highly unreasonable 
conduct constituting an extreme departure from the standards of investigation and reporting 
ordinarily adhered to by responsible publishers.”  Id. at 158. 
 192. United States v. Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. 2537, 2556–57 (2012) (Alito, J., dissenting). 
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accountable for the information they disseminate, both regarding their own 
platforms and those of their opponents.  While political speech enjoys the 
utmost protection, and rightfully so in order to encourage an informed 
democratic electorate, this protection should not be abused by permitting 
false political and campaign speech to tarnish the esteem and deference 
given to the First Amendment. 
B. Drawing a Parallel to the Commercial Speech Doctrine 
When examining how to analyze false campaign speech, courts should 
look at the precedent for commercial speech, particularly false 
advertising.193  In stark contrast to political speech, commercial speech 
receives the least protection because of the harms that it may cause.194  
Accordingly, under the Central Hudson test, commercial speech that is 
false is never protected.195  As the Court held, “there can be no 
constitutional objection to the suppression of commercial messages that do 
not accurately inform the public about lawful activity.  The government 
may ban forms of communication more likely to deceive the public than to 
inform it . . . .”196  All other “truthful” commercial speech must survive an 
intermediate level of scrutiny.197 
The same distinction should be made with false campaign speech, 
with the consideration of the importance of political speech.198  Many argue 
that any restriction on political opinions or ideas should receive strict 
 
 193. See Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n of N.Y., 447 U.S. 557, 
566 (1980) (holding that in order for speech to be protected “it at least must concern lawful 
activity and not be misleading”). 
 194. See Tom Hentoff, Note, Speech, Harm, and Self-Government: Understanding the 
Ambit of the Clear and Present Danger Test, 91 COLUM. L. REV. 1453, 1485 (1991).  
Hentoff observes that: 
The Supreme Court has recognized at least four types of harm that commercial 
speech, which is defined as speech that does “no more than propose, a commercial 
transaction,” can cause.  The first two harms, deception and the consummation of 
illegal transactions, cause commercial speech to receive no protection; the last 
two, the creation of a distraction that threatens safety and the consummation of a 
legal transaction of which the government disapproves . . . . 
Id. (citations omitted). 
 195. Cent. Hudson, 447 U.S. at 566. 
 196. Id. at 563. 
 197. See id. 
 198. See supra Part II-B.  “Whatever differences may exist about interpretations of the 
First Amendment, there is practically universal agreement that a major purpose of that 
Amendment was to protect the free discussion of governmental affairs.”  Mills v. Alabama, 
384 U.S. 214, 218 (1966). 
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scrutiny, a higher standard than truthful commercial speech.199  Arguably, 
the majority of political speech is considered opinion because it cannot be 
proven true or false.200  Thus, political opinion should be outside the 
purview of any false campaign speech statute, similar to the puffery 
defense in advertising law201 and the opinion defense in libel.202 
This said, false campaign speech of material fact should only receive 
intermediate scrutiny.203  Note that this is a stricter standard than false 
commercial speech which is not granted any protection, but less than the 
strict scrutiny level that political speech in the form of an opinion would 
receive.204  Thus, the government would only need to show an important 
state interest in restricting speech, the rule substantially serves that interest, 
and the restriction is not more extensive than necessary.205 
C.  Protecting the Integrity of the Electoral Process 
If false speech is not to be an unprotected category, false campaign 
speech should certainly not be a fundamental right deserving strict scrutiny 
because of the harms that it causes to the political system.206  False speech 
in campaigns has particularly adverse consequences on the integrity of the 
election process.207  Deception in the political system “may decrease the 
 
 199. “[T]here is no such thing as a false idea.” Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 
323, 339 (1974).  “However pernicious an opinion may seem, we depend for its correction 
not on the conscience of judges and juries but on the competition of other ideas.”  Id. at 
339–40 (citation omitted). 
 200. Moreover, “where a statement is supported by some basis in fact, courts [can find] 
insufficient evidence of actual malice even if the statement is ultimately found to be untrue.”  
Serv. Emps. Int’l Union Dist. 1199 v. Ohio Elections Comm’n, 822 N.E.2d 424, 431–32 
(Ohio Ct. App. 2004) (citations omitted). 
 201. See FTC Policy Statement on Deception, Letter from James C. Miller, III, 
Chairman, FTC, to Representative John D. Dingell (Oct. 14, 1983), 
https://www.ftc.gov/public-statements/1983/10/ftc-policy-statement-deception 
[https://perma.cc/X2QT-8B66?type=image]. 
 202. An opinion is one that cannot be proven true or false.  See Milkovich v. Lorain 
Journal Co., 497 U.S. 1, 13 (1990). 
 203. “Although honest utterance, even if inaccurate, may further the fruitful exercise of 
the right of free speech, it does not follow that the lie, knowingly and deliberately published 
about a public official, should enjoy a like immunity.”  Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 
75 (1964). 
 204. See infra note 233–37 and accompanying text. 
 205. See United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 377 (1968). 
 206. “The state interest in preventing fraud and libel . . . carries special weight during 
election campaigns when false statements, if credited, may have serious adverse 
consequences for the public at large.”  McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm’n, 514 U.S. 334, 
349 (1995). 
 207. See supra Part I-A. 
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average listener’s exposure to relevant viewpoints, and it may diminish 
citizens’ willingness and capacity to participate in the democratic 
process.”208  Furthermore, “[a] state may impose restrictions that promote 
the integrity of primary elections.”209  Similarly, safeguarding the public’s 
confidence in that process is just as compelling.210 
In many areas of free speech jurisprudence, the Court has applied 
intermediate scrutiny.211  In doing so, the Court has analyzed whether there 
is a “fit between statutory ends and means” by “examin[ing] speech-related 
harms, justifications, and potential alternatives.”212 This type of 
examination is used when a speech infringement “warrants neither 
near-automatic condemnation (as ‘strict scrutiny’ implies) nor 
near-automatic approval (as is implicit in ‘rational basis’ review).”213 
The U.S. Supreme Court has held that the government “has a 
compelling interest in protecting voters from confusion and undue 
influence.”214  The Court has recognized that political campaigns are often 
filled with lies and the system incentivizes lying because “[t]he principal 
activity of a candidate in our political system . . . consists in putting before 
the voters every conceivable aspect of his public and private life that he 
thinks may lead the electorate to gain a good impression of him.”215  The 
 
 208. Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 472 (2010) (Stevens, J., concurring in part 
and dissenting in part) (discussing how inundation of corporate speech has hurt the political 
system). 
 209. EU v. San Francisco Cty. Democratic Cent. Comm., 489 U.S. 214, 231 (1989) 
(citing Rosario v. Rockefeller, 410 U.S. 752, 761 (1973)) (overturning ban on primary 
endorsements). 
 210. See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 27 (1976).  “Preserving the integrity of the 
electoral process, preventing corruption, and ‘sustain[ing] the active, alert responsibility of 
the individual citizen in a democracy for the wise conduct of government’ . . . .”  First Nat’l 
Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 788–89 (1978) (quoting United States v. Int’l 
Union United Auto., 352 U.S. 567, 575 (1957)) (holding that corporations had the right to 
free speech). 
 211. E.g., United States v. Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. 2537, 2551 (2012) (Breyer, J., 
concurring). 
 212. Id. at 2540, 2551.  Justice Breyer explained intermediate scrutiny as the following: 
[The Court] has taken account of the seriousness of the speech-related harm the 
provision will likely cause, the nature and importance of the provision’s 
countervailing objectives, the extent to which the provision will tend to achieve 
those objectives, and whether there are other, less restrictive ways of doing so.  
Ultimately the Court has had to determine whether the statute works 
speech-related harm that is out of proportion to its justifications. 
Id. at 2551. 
 213. Id. at 2552. 
 214. Burson v. Freeman, 504 U.S. 191, 199 (1992) (citations omitted). 
 215. Monitor Patriot Co. v. Roy, 401 U.S. 265, 274 (1971). 
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Court has also said that “the use of the known lie as a tool is at once at odds 
with the premises of democratic government and with the orderly manner 
in which economic, social, or political change is to be effected.”216 
D. Implementing an Enforceable False Campaign Speech Statute 
The question may remain: why have an additional law that is enforced 
by the government when there is a tort that can be brought against a 
candidate who knowingly libels another candidate?  The argument for a 
separate statute is that libel is a tort law claim that is brought by an 
individual to protect his or her own reputation.217  Libel suits brought by 
public officials are next to impossible to win; thus they are rarely 
pursued.218  Moreover, the time and cost are often prohibitive;219 any relief 
would not be until well after the election is over;220 and it is often difficult 
to prove personal damages.221 
False campaign speech laws, however, are enforced by the 
government not to protect the target’s reputation but rather the public’s 
compelling interest of having sound elections,222 similar to how perjury is 
used to protect the public’s interest in the integrity of the judicial system.223  
Any violation of a false campaign speech law should be prosecuted by an 
independent, nonpartisan government agency.224  The agency would have 
the burden of proving by clear and convincing evidence that “the 
 
 216. Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 75 (1964). 
 217. See New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964). 
 218. See Sarah Staveley-O’Carroll, Note, Libel Tourism Laws: Spoiling the Holiday and 
Saving the First Amendment? 4 N.Y.U. J.L. & LIBERTY 252 (2009) (discussing how 
American plaintiffs have forum shopped for more plaintiff-friendly jurisdictions). 
 219. Litigants in a libel case “incur substantial costs. Even when no awards are actually 
paid, material costs most obviously include the legal fees paid, the value of the time 
committed, and skyrocketing insurance premiums.”  Edmond Costantini & Mary Paul Nash, 
SLAPP/SLAPPback: The Misuse of Libel Law for Political Purposes and a Countersuit 
Response, 7 J.L. & POL. 417, 420 (1990–1991) (footnote omitted) (discussing the costs to 
libel defendants). 
 220. See id. at 420–21 n.9 (discussing the costs associated with the time it takes to try 
libel cases). 
 221. Evan Richman, Note, Deception in Political Advertising: The Clash Between the 
First Amendment and Defamation Law, 16 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 667, 677 (1998). 
 222. See Developments, supra note 49 (citing the cases upholding state laws against false 
campaign speech holding that these laws are directed at the protection of the political 
process and not the individual’s reputation). 
 223. See United States v. Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. 2537, 2546 (2012). 
 224. See Goldman, supra note 37, at 891. 
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challenged statement was false, material, and negligently made.”225  
Penalties for violation should at the very least require the defendant to 
place a retraction of the statement.226  In accordance with the judicial 
system, all decisions would be reviewable by a court of law.227 
It is also necessary that any false campaign speech statute be no more 
extensive than necessary.  False campaign speech laws should be 
applicable to any person or group that is involved in a campaign.228  Such 
laws should pertain to statements of fact which are verifiable and made 
with actual malice.229  The U.S. Supreme Court has previously found that 
actual malice is an acceptable standard that allows for “breathing space” 
and does not have a chilling effect on protected speech.230  Thus, if the 
Court allows for the actual malice standard to be the test for false campaign 
speech of material fact, then sufficient “breathing room” is given for 
protected speech.231  Ultimately, with this statutory standard of fault, 
politicians will continue to promote themselves because the burden of 
proof for the government is three-fold: (1) the speech has to be a statement 
of fact (which most political ideas are not); (2) the statement was false; and 
(3) it was published with actual malice.232 
 
 225. Id. at 915.  The standard false campaign speech law is classified as a misdemeanor.  
See, e.g., MINN. STAT. § 211B.06(a) (2014). 
 226. This retraction should be of equal time and on similar media as the original 
statement was posted.  Colin B. White, The Straight Talk Express: Yes We Can Have a 
False Political Advertising Statute, 13 UCLA J.L. & TECH. 1, 53 (2009). 
 227. This was an issue in both Rickert v. Washington, 168 P.3d 826, 827 (Wash. 2007) 
and 281 Care Comm. v. Arenson, 638 F.3d 621 (2011), cert. denied, 133 S. Ct. 61 (2012).  
See Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union of U.S., 466 U.S. 485, 514 (1984) (holding that, 
pursuant to the actual malice review standard, “[a]ppellate judges in such a case must 
exercise independent judgment and determine whether the record establishes actual malice 
with convincing clarity”). 
 228. See Richard L. Hasen, A Constitutional Right to Lie in Campaigns and Elections?, 
74 MONT. L. REV. 53, 74 (2013). 
 229. This could include false statements about where to vote, when to vote, false claims 
of endorsement, false statements about holding elected office, or other verifiable positions.  
Id. at 70 (citing Eugene Volokh, Freedom of Speech and Knowing Falsehoods, THE 
VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (June 28, 2012, 5:19 PM), http://volokh.com/2012/06/28/freedom-of-
speech-and-knowing-falsehoods/ [http://perma.cc/D7DA-B9PX]). 
 230. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 342 (1974) (citation omitted).  “Plainly 
many deserving plaintiffs, including some intentionally subjected to injury, will be unable to 
surmount the barrier of the New York Times test.”  Id.; see also supra note 159. 
 231. Goldman, supra note 37, at 904.  However, the actual malice standard takes the 
power away from the statute as it is very difficult to prove. 
 232. See Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co., 497 U.S. 1, 14–16 (1990). 
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An enforceable false campaign speech statute would not have a 
chilling effect on protected speech.233  First, it is difficult to classify most 
political speech as material facts, so most political speech would not be 
targeted by this statute.  Also, as with many of the current statutes, the 
government must prove by clear and convincing evidence that the 
candidate knew that the statement was false.234  Moreover, candidates have 
great incentive to win and will continue to promote themselves, just like 
advertisers still promote themselves despite the lower level of protection 
under Central Hudson.235  Currently, it is in the best interest of politicians 
to deceive in order to win;236 as the law stands now, politicians not only 
have the motive to lie, they also have impunity to do so.237 
CONCLUSION 
Scholars almost universally agree that the primary purpose of the First 
Amendment was “to protect the free discussion of governmental affairs.”238  
It is this principle which underlies the argument that the First Amendment 
“‘has its fullest and most urgent application precisely to the conduct of 
campaigns for political office.’”239  Considering the decisions in Alvarez 
and Citizens United, the U.S. Supreme Court would need to fundamentally 
 
 233. See Staci Lieffring, Note, First Amendment and the Right to Lie: Regulating 
Knowingly False Campaign Speech After United States v. Alvarez, 97 MINN. L. REV. 1047, 
1075 (2012–2013) (outlining the different legal remedies that could be available to the 
government while allowing the law to be more extensive than necessary). 
 234. This would be the exacting standards the Court would require for constitutionality.  
See Hasen, supra note 228, at 69.  Some scholars have argued that since actual malice is so 
difficult to prove, false campaign speech laws should only use negligence as the fault 
standard.  But after Alvarez and Citizens United, it would be impossible to move the Court 
that far.  See, e.g., Goldman, supra note 37. 
 235. Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n of N.Y., 447 U.S. 557 
(1980).  The perceived durability of false and misleading commercial speech is one reason it 
can be regulated without a showing of actual malice.  See Ibanez v. Fla. Dep’t of Bus. & 
Prof’l Regulation, 512 U.S. 136, 142 (1994); Bates v. State Bar, 433 U.S. 350, 383–84 
(1977). 
 236. “The principal activity of a candidate in our political system . . . consists in putting 
before the voters every conceivable aspect of his public and private life that he thinks may 
lead the electorate to gain a good impression of him.”  Monitor Patriot Co. v. Roy, 401 U.S. 
265, 274 (1971). 
 237. See Rickert v. Washington, 168 P.3d 826, 833 (Wash. 2007) (Madsen, J., 
dissenting).  “It is little wonder that so many view political campaigns with distrust and 
cynicism.”  Id. 
 238. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 14 (1976) (quoting Mills v. Alabama, 384 U.S. 214, 
218 (1966)). 
 239. Id. at 15 (quoting Monitor, 401 U.S. at 272). 
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change its jurisprudence in order to include false, non-defamatory political 
speech as a category unprotected by the First Amendment.240 
Despite this, the right to vote is a fundamental right and that right 
should include the ability to vote in legitimate elections uncorrupted by 
deliberate deception.  Moreover, this right must be balanced with other 
rights, just like courts balance the right to a fair trial or the right to privacy 
with the right to free speech.241  Courts must also balance the right to a fair 
election with the right to free speech.242  Accordingly, prohibitions on false 
campaign speech on material fact should be re-categorized as only 
receiving intermediate scrutiny.243  Under this classification, the 
government certainly has an important state interest in the integrity of the 
political process,244 as well as the power to reduce the harms caused by 
such lies.245  This interest is substantially served by such rules and is no 
more extensive than necessary in light of the actual malice requirement.246 
Unfortunately, the current precedent that protects false campaign 
speech has effectively “turn[ed] political campaigns into contests of the 
best stratagems of lies and deceit.”247  By giving such broad protection to 
intentional lies in politics, the Court has ignored a long history of precedent 
which recognizes that the First Amendment does not protect false factual 
statements that cause harm and serve no legitimate interest.248  False 
campaign speech is a blemish that the American political system has 
permitted to continue to exist.  Now, with more money spent on elections 
and campaigns than ever before, it is essential that false campaign speech 
be declared intolerable and be prohibited from tainting the electorate who 
consume it. 
 
 
 240. United States v. Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. 2537 (2012); Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 
310 (2010); see supra Part III.  The recent decisions of the Court suggest that it may never 
declare another category of unprotected speech.  See Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. at 2537. 
 241. See supra note 212 and accompanying text. 
 242. See Burson v. Freeman, 504 U.S. 191, 198 (1992). 
 243. See supra Part II-A. 
 244. See Burson, 504 U.S. at 198. 
 245. Id. at 198–99. 
 246. See supra Part II-B. 
 247. Rickert v. Washington, 168 P.3d 826, 833 (Wash. 2007) (Madsen, J., dissenting). 
 248. See, e.g., United States v. Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. 2537, 2557 (2012) (Alito, J., 
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